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The Evolution of Tactics: a Moral Look at the Decision to 
Target Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of 
Japan’s Combined Fleet 
 
 
  The combat death of enemy leaders is nothing new 
to warfare.  Kings such as Harold II of England, Richard 
the Lionhearted, Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII have 
fallen in battle.1
World War II however, saw something totally new and 
foreign to warfare; the blatant and intentional targeting 
of an individual by high command with the sole intent of 
bringing about his death.  American commanders did not 
attempt to capture and interrogate, or possibly take a 
hostage to ransom for peace, the only goal was to bring 
about the individuals death.  At the time there seems to be 
  Warfare in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries took on an almost gentlemanly nature, if such can 
be said about warfare, in which the goal was to defeat the 
enemy general’s tactics proving you to be the better 
general.  Killing your opponent therefore was not desirable 
for anyone can beat a dead man, but if he was alive and 
forced to either retreat or surrender then there were no 
excuses to be made, you had out maneuvered the enemy. 
                                               
* Shugaku Homma, “Official Portrait,” n.d. 
<http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/prs-for/japan/japrs-xz/i-yamto.htm> 
(23 May 03). 
1 Joseph G. Dawson III, “Targeting Military Leaders: A Historical 
Review”, edited by R. Cargill Hall, Lightning Over Bougainville, 
Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991, 33. 
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little, if any, concern as to the acceptability of such an 
action, but years after the event some would begin to 
question the use of such tactics.  I suppose it is natural 
for it is said, “only when security is safeguarded do 
strong moral concerns emerge regarding the rights and well-
being of outside parties.”2
 The mission that fostered such concern is now simply 
referred to as the ““Yamamoto Mission””, after the admiral 
who was the sole target of the sortie.  Any critical look 
at the mission would be incomplete without some 
investigation into who the quarry was and how or why he 
drew the deadly attention of his adversaries, and a look 
into the actual mission itself that gave rise to the 
discussion. 
  It is the intentional targeting 
of combat leaders, which are still in use today as 
evidenced in execution of the United States lead offensive 
in Iraq, that I will discus in this paper. 
 In order to answer the question regarding the 
acceptability of targeting enemy combat leaders we must 
look at two key issues: the legality of the act and the 
morality of the action.  Morality is naturally more 
complicated to answer than legality, for who decides what 
                                               
2 Brunk, Gregory and Donald Secrest, Howard Tamashiro.   “Military Views 
of Morality and War: An Empirical Study of the Attitudes of Retired 
American Officers,” International Studies Quarterly. 34, no.1 (1990): 
103. 
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is moral?  There is no single set of moral principles 
agreed to as there is for the conduct of war.  Instead, 
American culture lives according to a moral system much 
different from that system which dictates the lives and 
actions of the Japanese.  Therefore, this paper concerns 
itself only with the morality of the ““Yamamoto Mission”” 
as viewed by American culture, and leaves the question of 
Japanese morality for another to address.   
Since the morality of an action in the American moral 
system is largely dependent upon the intent we can look to 
the possible reasons as to why a commander would order such 
an action, Paul Woodruff list three possible motivators for 
singling out Yamamoto for death: revenge for Pearl Harbor; 
punishment for the war crimes he was ultimately responsible 
for; and tactical reasons.3
 Morality and warfare may at first appear to be an 
oxymoron to many, and though war is unarguably horrible, it 
is not unarguably immoral.  True, there are immoral wars, 
just as there are immoral priests, and there are immoral 
acts within a “good war”, just as there are immoral acts of 
law within any legal system.  If a war is to be moral 
however, then the matter in which it is fought must also be 
 
                                               
3 Paul B. Woodruff, “Was It Right To Gun For Yamamoto?” edited by R. 
Cargill Hall, Lightning Over Bougainville, (Washington D.C.:  
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 48. 
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moral, the tactics used must champion those values held by 
the society in question for by definition when one abandons 
their morals they become immoral.  Morality is not a static 
ideal; it changes and evolves with individuals and within 
society.  Therefore, it is important for a society to 
review its past practices from time to time in order to 
ensure their moral principles are exemplified in their 
actions.  When we evaluate past practices however, it is 
imperative to remember not to judge those responsible on 
present beliefs, for those beliefs may not have been held 
when the action took place. 
In order to understand American leaders’ decision to 
target Yamamoto we must first familiarize ourselves with 
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who he was and why America felt 
threatened by his continued existence during the Second 
World War.  A brief look into the life of Yamamoto shows a 
man who’s mind is constantly at work judging and 
anticipating the next move, traits that would make him one 
of Japan’s most able naval commanders and thereby one of 
America’s most notable adversaries. 
 Yamamoto was born in 1884 to Takano Sadayoshi, but 
following the death of his parents and following a common 
Japanese tradition he was adopted by Yamamoto Tatewaki and 
renounced his father’s surname.  In 1904 he graduated from 
 6 
Japan’s Naval Academy at Etajima and first saw combat a 
year latter at the battle of Japan Sea on board the 
Nisshin.  Yamamoto himself was seriously wounded in the 
battle when one of the ships guns, stressed by the repeated 
firing and the rapid cooling as waves broke over the ships 
guns, exploded tearing two fingers from his left hand4 and 
peppering his lower extremities with over one hundred and 
twenty fragments.5
 In 1919 he was stationed in the United States for 
language study at Harvard University, but failed to attend 
class as he was preoccupied studying United States oil 
production and American industry traveling from Detroit to 
Texas to Mexico.
 
6   His failure to attend class apparently 
did little to effect his academic performance however as he 
was a top student of his class.7
                                               
4 Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy. 
(Tokyo: Kodansha International LTD. 1969), 2. 
 Yamamoto further occupied 
his time with special interests in military articles 
pertaining to American air arms and their tactics.  It was 
during this time that Yamamoto became convinced of the 
future role aircraft would play in combat and Japan’s need 
5 Ibid, 65.  
6 R. Cargill Hall, Lightning Over Bougainville. (Washington D.C.: 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 4. 
7 Thomas G. Lanphier, “I Shot Down Yamamoto,” The Reader’s Digest, 
December, 1966, 82-87. 
 7 
to develop an air navy, idea’s which he was to push forward 
whole heartedly when he returned home to Japan in 1921. 
 The idea of an air arm was not well received in Japan.  
Many senior officers felt that the strength of a nation was 
still directly linked to, and symbolized in, battleships.8  
Yamamoto often found himself in violent arguments with 
these fellow officers, which required the mediation of 
Prince Fushimi, about the future role of aircraft carriers 
and the uselessness of battleships.9  Though Yamamoto’s 
dreams of a navy built around aircraft were not to be 
realized during his life, his able foresight and 
determination are largely responsible for Japan’s ability 
to make the Pearl Harbor attack and wage a prolonged war 
against the United States.  His then radical ideas are now 
considered a matter of logic amongst military strategist.10
 1926 saw the return of Yamamoto to the United States, 
this time as the naval attaché to the Japanese embassy in 
Washington D.C.
 
11
                                               
8 Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, 91. 
  Here his overwhelming passion and skill 
at gambling first became known to American officers who 
taught Yamamoto American games such as: poker, bridge, and 
baseball, games he was to love and play for the rest of his 
life.   
9 Ibid, 92. 
10 Ibid, 92-93. 
11 R. Cargill Hall, Lightning Over Bougainville. 6. 
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One could argue that it was this love for games of 
chance that formulated Admiral Yamamoto’s strategic 
methods.  Hoketsu Kota observed Yamamoto’s tactics to be 
characterized by sudden assaults while playing shogi, a 
Japanese game resembling chess.  Kota later made the remark 
that had America gone into the character of Yamamoto more 
carefully prior to the war that we might have guessed the 
war would have been launched by a sudden attack.12
 As a Rear Admiral, Yamamoto participated in the London 
Naval disarmament conference of 1930, where he 
unsuccessfully pushed American and British representatives 
for a new treaty that would allow Japan a larger navy.  
Yamamoto was again chosen to represent Japan at the 1934 
preliminary talks for the London Naval Conference where we 
are afforded a look at how Admiral Yamamoto was always 
thinking strategically when he spoke in English to American 
and British representatives on ordinary matters, but would 
use an interpreter on matters of importance.  Yamamoto is 
reported to have said, “It takes twice as long when you 
have an interpreter, and gives you time to watch the other 
man and consider your next move.”
 
13
                                               
12 Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial 
Navy. 86. 
 
13 Ibid, 36. 
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 In 1936, against his own desires, Yamamoto was 
appointed vice-minister of the navy where he used his 
political influence to weed out war hawks in an effort to 
use the navy to check “the army’s autocratic methods” 14 
towards war.  It was also during this time that Yamamoto, 
perhaps unknowingly, predicted America’s future tactics 
when he said; “As I see it, naval operations in the future 
will consist of capturing an island, then building an 
airfield in as short a time as possible… moving up air 
units, and using them to gain air and surface control over 
the next stretch of ocean.”15
 Yamamoto had always argued against the Tripartite Pact 
and war with Britain and the United States.
 
16  His stubborn 
opposition against the Japanese army and these issues 
earned him great scorn by many right wing Japanese 
statesmen, and resulted in conspiracies to discredit him 
and countless death threats.  At least one of which was 
proven serious when a man was arrested with a load of 
dynamite and claiming he had intended to blow up Yamamoto.17
 In 1939, Yamamoto was reassigned to Commander and 
Chief of the Combined Fleet when the signing of the non-
  
                                               
14 Ibid, 120. 
15 Ibid, 126. 
16 Carroll V. Glines. Attack on Yamamoto. (New York: Orion Books, 1990), 
49. 
17 Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial 
Navy. 167. 
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aggression treaty between Germany and Russia sent shock 
waves though the government as Japan felt betrayed by 
Germany’s treaty with Japan’s longtime enemy.  The result 
was the resignation of the Hiranuma cabinet and Yamamoto’s 
reassignment as fear for his life prevented him from 
retaining his position.  The fear was not his own however, 
for as Yamamoto himself wrote, “To give up his life for his 
sovereign and country is the military man’s most cherished 
wish: what difference whether he give it up at the front or 
behind the lines?”18
 Many similarities can be drawn between Admiral 
Yamamoto and the famous American General Robert E. Lee.  
Like Lee, Yamamoto strongly opposed war with the United 
States and held great respect and admiration for the 
American government and its people.  Yamamoto viewed the 
fascist governments of Germany and Italy as immoral and 
took every opportunity to oppose their unification with 
Japan, and saw the error in his own government’s policies 
of imperialism and the destructiveness those policies 
offered the Japanese people.  Like Lee however, Yamamoto 
was a warrior who could not turn against nor abandoned his 
own homeland, and so it was with a heavy heart that 
Yamamoto, as the newly appointed Commander and Chief, 
 
                                               
18 Ibid, 166. 
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turned his efforts toward the approaching war with the 
United States. 
 We can not know when exactly Yamamoto began to develop 
his plan for the Pearl Harbor attack, but it appears that 
it, at least in part, was inspired by an earlier scenario 
developed by a Kusaka Ryunosuke in 1927.19
The plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor was strongly 
resisted by nearly every ranking member of both the Navy 
and the Army.  It apparently was too non-conventional for 
the senior members of the General Staff.  Yamamoto insisted 
however, and even went so far as to threaten to resign if 
the plan was not adopted.
  Kusaka was asked 
to give a course in aviation tactics to ten senior officers 
of the navy, lacking any idea as to what to lecture about 
he developed a theoretical attack via aircraft on Pearl 
Harbor.  By 1940, though the plan had been around for 
nearly thirteen years, it had never been offered forth as a 
plausible scenario until Admiral Yamamoto suggested using 
it to open the war against the United States.  
20
                                               
19 Ibid, 193. 
  The plan was adopted and 
Yamamoto was on his way to becoming one of Japan’s most 
revered heroes. 
20 Burke Davis, Get Yamamoto (New York: Random House, 1969), 37. 
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 Pearl Harbor was not his only victory however; Wake, 
Dutch Indies, Burma and other Japanese victories were a 
product of his able leadership and skilled tactics.  Though 
some have criticized his actions at Midway,21 American 
forces then and now have always maintained that it was only 
due to a recent brake in the Japanese code that prevented 
yet another victory there.22
By looking at Yamamoto’s life it should be apparent 
that this was a man who was always thinking strategically, 
as evidence by his conduct at the London Naval disarmament 
conference, and very capable of anticipating his enemy’s 
tactics, remember he predicted the United States island 
hopping campaign.  After six months of repeated defeats at 
the hands of Yamamoto
   
23 it had become apparent to the 
American forces that Yamamoto had learned the American 
conduct of war well from his time spent in the United 
States,24
 On the evening of April 13, 1943 United States code 
breakers intercepted a message detailing Admiral Yamamoto’s 
 and was hindering the American war effort. 
                                               
21 James C. Ryan, “History may have given Japanese Admiral Isoroku 
Yamamoto more credit for military genius than he deserved”, 
Perspectives 14, no. 1 (1999): 66-68. 
22 Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John Costello, And I was There 
(New York: William Morrow and company, INC., 1985), 405. 
23 Roger H. Beaumont, “Targeting Military Leaders: Another View,” in 
Lightning Over Bougainville (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution 
Press, 1991), 36. 
24 Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, 73. 
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planed activities for April 18.25  He was to fly to 
Bougainville for an inspection of his front line troops in 
an effort to boost morale before “Operation I”.  “Operation 
I” was an offensive move to retake the island of 
Guadalcanal,26 which had cost the Marines nearly 4,000 
casualties in six months of fighting,27 and was considered a 
necessity by the Japanese for the planned offensive against 
Australia.28
Admiral Nimitz was immediately informed of Yamamoto’s 
intention of flying within 400 miles of United States 
forces and a discussion began about the possibility of an 
intercept mission intended to kill the Japanese Admiral.  
Commandeer Edwin T. Layton observed that Yamamoto was 
unique in his high standing amongst not only the Japanese 
navy but also the Japanese civilian population stating, 
“…aside from the Emperor probably no man in Japan is now 
more important to civilian morale.  If he were shot down, 
it would demoralize their navy… it would stun the nation.”
   
29
                                               
25 John T. Wible, The “Yamamoto Mission” (The Nimitz Foundation 1988), 
7. 
  
Nimitz however, responded with concern over who would 
26 Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, 344. 
27 Frank O. Hough, “Action at Guadalcanal, “Island of Death,” in 
Reader’s Digest Illustrated story of World War II Pleasantville, (New 
York: The Reader’s Digest Association, INC., 1969), 226. 
28 Ibid, 229. 
29 John T. Wible. The “Yamamoto Mission”: Sunday April 18, 1943, 9. 
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replace the Japanese Commander in Chief,30 for though 
Yamamoto was a brilliant strategist there is some value in 
knowing your opponent and his strategy.  It was decided 
however, that there was no equal to Yamamoto with Layton 
saying to Nimitz, “it would be just as if they shot you 
down.  There isn’t anybody to replace you.”31
 At the discussions conclusion Nimitz wrote a dispatch 
to Admiral Halsey informing him of Yamamoto’s itinerary and 
authorizing preliminary planning for a mission to intercept 
Yamamoto’s bomber.  Wanting to protect the code broken by 
American cryptographers, it was recommended that the 
information be attributed to Australian coast watchers 
around Rabaul. 
 
 Understanding the gravity of the proposed mission and 
the possibility of repercussions for targeting so important 
a person, Nimitz took care to notify Secretary Knox of the 
opportunity at hand and requested authorization for the 
mission.  Though there is little written about how 
Washington addressed the information it appears that 
Secretary Knox questioned the Navy advocate general about 
the legality of the mission,32
                                               
30 E. B. Potter. Nimitz (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 
1976), 233. 
 and discussed it among 
churchmen in regards to the morality of such a blatant 
31 Carroll V. Glines, Attack on Yamamoto, 4. 
32 E. B. Potter, Nimitz 233. 
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attempt on a specific individuals life.  Though there seems 
to be some question as to Presidents Roosevelt’s personal 
approval,33 most sources agree that the President did 
authorize the mission.34
 When the mission was being planned and executed Major 
Mitchell, the flight leader responsible for the planning 
and execution of the mission, thought the chance of success 
was about a thousand to one.  The mission required ground 
crews to work through the night in order to equip the P-
38’s with large belly tanks that would supply enough fuel 
to travel the more than 400 miles to the target.
  The question had been decided, the 
mission was on. 
35  The 
course of travel would have to be over water the entire 
length of the journey to avoid detection by Japanese 
outpost on nearby islands.  The formation would be required 
to fly at wave top height to avoid detection by radar, 
using nothing more than a map strapped to the flight 
leader’s thigh, a navy compass specially installed in the 
lead aircraft, and a wrist watch for timing.36
                                               
33 Roger Pineau, “The Code Break” in Lightning Over Bougainville 
(Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 43. 
  The mission 
was also seen as a suicide mission, for when Secretary Knox 
34 E.B. Potter, Nimitz 233., Burke Davis, Get Yamamoto 16. and Carroll 
V. Glines, Attack on Yamamoto 9 
35 John P. Condon, “Bringing Down Yamamoto,” Proceedings of the United 
States Naval Institute 116, no. 11(1988): 88. 
36 Carroll V. Glines, Attack on Yamamoto 34. 
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had made a visit to Guadalcanal fifty planes were activated 
to provide protection for the aircraft carrying the 
secretary, it 
seemed only 
logical that the 
Japanese would do 
something 
similar.37
 To compound 
the problem of so 
long an 
interception, the 
American pilots 
had to estimate 
the aircraft 
flown by the 
Japanese (there 
were two 
different types 
of bombers 
available with different top speeds), the course of flight, 
speed and weather in order to approximate a time and place 
   
                                               
37 Carroll V. Glines, “Whose Kill Was It,” Aviation, May 1993, 44. 
38 Hall, Lightning Over Bougainville, 21. 
39 Hall, Lightning Over Bougainville, 21. 
38 
39 
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to intercept.  Should the American plane arrive to early 
the prey would be spooked and enemy fighters could scramble 
to intercept, too late and the target would be on the 
ground and nearly impossible to distinguish.  Looking back, 
Major Mitchell has decided a million to one odds was 
probably more accurate. 
Despite the overwhelming odds the mission was a 
stunning success and earned its place in history as the 
longest aerial intercept in history.40  Of the eighteen 
fighters to depart that morning only two encountered 
problems and had to abort (only one was related to the 
newly installed belly tanks).  No fighters were waiting to 
escort the admiral’s bomber, and though the American 
fighters only expected one bomber there were two to contend 
with and both were eliminated.41
                                               
40 John P. Condon, “Brining Down Yamamoto,” Proceedings of the United 
States Naval Institute, 116,    no. 11 (1988): 86. 
  Only one American pilot, 
41 Two pilots have laid claim to the downing of the aircraft carrying 
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto; Thomas G. Lanphier and Rex Barber.  Lanphier 
claims that  after downing a Zero he flipped over onto his back and 
noticed Barber fighting off a mess of Zeros, at the same instant he 
spotted a bomber moving low across the jungle trying to escape.  
Lanphier states he became “Very stubborn about making the most of the 
one good shot I had coming up.”  This is interesting also for in all of 
Lanphier’s accounts he is engaging the bomber from 70 degrees, “an 
impossible angle to hit anything”, and “a lucky” shot to use his own 
words.  So much for making the best of the one good chance, by his own 
admission he never had a good chance.  
 In another account he states that knowing he was out of range 
from the bomber he checked his guns in the bombers direction, he did 
not fire the P-38’s canon and yet the right engine started to burn and 
then broke away from the bomber causing the bomber to flip into the 
jungle.  What catches the eye here is the checking of the guns.  A 
World War II fighter plane was very limited in ammunition, carrying 
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Raymond K. Hine, failed to return,42 and most importantly, 
the Japanese never linked the attack to a code break.43
 Tens of thousands of mourners turned out for 
Yamamoto’s funeral,
 
44 and though the Japanese people were 
stunned by his death there appears to have been little 
discussion about the acceptability of the events 
surrounding his death.  It took forty-five years before the 
morality of the mission was questioned at a symposium held 
to honor the events of that April day.45
Joseph G. Dawson shows us that there is little 
evidence of targeting specific individuals for death in 
wars previous to the 20th century, and even cites an example 
where the Duke of Wellington forbids his artillerymen from 
   
                                                                                                                                            
approximately only four hundred rounds.  The significance of the 
carrying capacity of a fighter plane is that an experienced fighter 
pilot does not check his guns, which wastes ammo, after already 
shooting down an enemy aircraft. 
Barber’s version is quite different, he states that a banking 
movement meant to line Barber up with the bombers caused him to loose 
sight of one of the bombers.  Not knowing which bomber Yamamoto was in, 
they had only planed on one, Barber engaged and closed with the one 
remaining bomber.  He states that he fired into the right engine of the 
bomber and moved to the left through the fuselage of the bomber to the 
left engine and back again to the center of the fuselage.  At about the 
time he centered his fire on the fuselage the plane slowed and came up 
on one wing.  When Barber broke off his engagement the Bomber had 
leveled off and was rapidly descending in smoke.  Barber has never made 
a claim that he actually witnessed the bomber go down. 
The controversy was officially settled by splitting the credit 
between the two pilots, but for those who care to investigate there is 
still plenty of evidence available to prove that only one is deserving 
of the credit. 
42 Burk Davis, Get Yamamoto, 172. 
43 Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial 
Navy, 369. 
44Ibid, 391. 
45 Hall, Lightning Over Bougainville, xv. 
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firing on Napoleon when the chance arose at the battle of 
Waterloo.46
The shift in World War II to elaborate camouflage 
schemes for command-and-control centers, and both Churchill 
and Hitler’s time spent in underground bunkers acknowledge 
the known risk of leadership.  The French forces even went 
so far as to cease using radios in command-and-control 
units in order to not attract enemy air attack while the 
United States specifically targeted suspected German 
headquarters. 
  On the other hand, Roger Beaumont tells us how 
this trend began to change in the 20th century, citing such 
examples of the British commando attempt on Field Marshal 
Rommel.  Woodruff and Davenport however, argue the morality 
of targeting Yamamoto.  Woodruff argues that American 
intent was to bring the war to an end as soon as possible 
and that it was believed that the death of Admiral Yamamoto 
would help to do this and therefore America’s decision was 
morally acceptable.  Davenport generally agrees with 
Woodruff but draws the opposite conclusion, because he 
believes Yamamoto’s contributions after the war would have 
been great, yet they were denied by this act. 
 The attack on Yamamoto was in no way unique to World 
War II except in its success.  British commandos acting on 
                                               
46 Dawson, “Targeting Military Leaders: A Historical Review,” 35. 
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information gleaned from an Arab informant attempted to 
eliminate Field Marshal Rommel on the 17th of November, 1941 
on a mission that required the commandos be launched from a 
submarine, move 15-20 miles inland by cover of darkness and 
speak German to bait a guard to open a door.  The guard 
resisted however and nearly all the commando’s involved 
where either killed or captured.  As it would turn out, 
Rommel had used the building only once as his headquarters, 
and, in any event, had been in Rome at the time of the 
attack.47  However, those captured were treated quite well,48
 Rommel was nearly killed on the 17th of July 1944 when 
a spitfire, piloted by Canadian Charley Fox, spotted a 
staff car traveling at high speeds along a road.
 
indicating nothing spectacular was thought of the effort 
for if the attempt had been perceived as criminal then 
Germany would have been free to prosecute the offenders 
regardless of their military status. 
49
                                               
47 Charles Messenger, The Commandos: 1940-1946. (London: William Kimber 
& Co. Limited, 1985), 114. 
  Fox’s 
attack caused the staff car to crash, injuring Rommel.  
Though it was not known who was in the vehicle and it was a 
chance encounter, the attack on a staff car can only have 
48 Ibid, 39 
49 Roger A. Beaumont, “Targeting Military Leaders: Another View,” in 
Lightning Over Bougainville (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution 
Press), 38-39. 
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one purpose, to kill the occupants, and privates do not 
ride in staff cars except as drivers. 
 Yamamoto himself must have understood the danger 
associated with being the commander in chief for on the 
morning he boarded the bomber for that fateful flight he 
donned his dark green uniform, which he rarely wore, 
instead of the white dress uniform he nearly always wore.50
 We have seen that the practice of targeting military 
leaders was in fact in effect during World War II, but does 
this mean the “Yamamoto Mission” was morally justified, or 
was it simply following an immoral trend?  Here I turn your 
attention first to legality and then towards morality.  
However, let us discuss briefly the difference between 
legality and morality. 
  
There can be no doubt that the shift of decapitating enemy 
forces by removing the command element when possible was in 
full swing during World War II. 
 Laws are created as an official means of governing the 
actions of the citizens which live under the jurisdiction 
of that set of laws and a machine for addressing those 
individuals who violate them.  Morality on the other hand 
provides individuals and societies with a set of ideals 
                                               
50 Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial 
Navy, 347. 
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seen as to be inherently a part of humanity by a particular 
group.  There are several key differences here.  Law 
directly address specific issues i.e., who has the right of 
way at an intersection, whereas morality provides a concept 
that address non-specific issues such as allowing an 
elderly woman with a heavy burden to pass in front of you 
at the check out line.  Laws can not possibly address every 
dispute that could arise; they only seek to address those 
most likely to arise.  Where laws fail to provide guidance 
it is expected that individuals will turn toward their 
moral compass. 
 The laws of war do not prohibit the targeting of 
generals and admirals; in fact the killing of soldiers is 
nearly always permissible, unless they lay down their 
weapons in which case it is always illegal.51  In fact, the 
underlying concept in the laws of war is military 
necessity,52
                                               
51 Douglas P. Lackey, The Ethics of War and Peace (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989),   66. 
 meaning that even those things prohibited by 
the laws of war, such as the killing of civilians, are 
permissible if they are a matter of military necessity.  In 
other words if a town is held by the enemy, and the only 
means to secure the town will result in civilian casualties 
then it is permissible to inflict those casualties.  This 
52 Sheldon M. Cohen, Arms and Judgment (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 
6. 
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is perhaps unsettling for many, and it indeed should be, 
for military necessity is a slippery slope, but this goes 
beyond the scope of this paper.  The other side to the coin 
however, is that if the military objectives can be 
accomplished with out securing the town then not only is it 
illegal to kill the civilians, it becomes illegal to kill 
the soldiers within the town (as long as they do not 
attempt to engage the opposing army). 
 Yamamoto was the commander in chief of the combined 
fleet of Japan and viewed by American commanders as the 
best commander available to the Japanese.  The goal of 
American commanders, as we will see, was to bring the war 
to a close as quickly as possible and it was believed that 
the death of Yamamoto would help to achieve such a speedy 
end.  Under the laws of war then and now, the mission to 
kill Yamamoto was a legal act of war.  
 As stated earlier however, there are instances where 
what is legal is not moral.  It may be legal to sue your 
wife for injuring your son in a car accident, knowing the 
insurance will pay the settlement, but most would agree it 
is not moral.  Is it possible that the “Yamamoto Mission” 
falls under this category?  Was it legal to kill Yamamoto, 
but immoral?  Woodruff says we must look to intent to 
determine the morality of the mission and list three 
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possible motivations for killing Yamamoto; revenge, 
punishment and tactical.53
 The question of revenge is complicated by the natural 
possession of it by combatants.  Battle cries have been 
used for centuries in combat, often times these cries are 
of people or places which represent a great loss for the 
army.  Battle cries are meant to stir up emotion, to anger 
the troops so that their thirst for revenge will inspire 
heroic efforts which will carry them to victory.  
Yamamoto’s prominent role in the Japanese Navy and as the 
mastermind of Pearl Harbor made him a natural target of 
vengeance, and in fact revenge was a factor for both the 
pilots and the commanders involved in the “Yamamoto 
Mission”.
 
54  In fact Besby Holmes, one of the pilots in the 
killer section, was in church that Sunday morning at Pearl 
Harbor when the bombs began to fall, and was in the air 
within a half an hour of the start of the attack, but by 
then the planes were gone.55
                                               
53 Woodruff, “Was It Right To Gun For Yamamoto,” 48. 
  We can only assume that Mr. 
Holmes lost friends that day, and having been selected to 
attack Yamamoto must have been very satisfying to his 
natural thirst for retribution.  However, being that Holmes 
was not a part of the decision to target Yamamoto his 
54 Burke Davis, Get Yamamoto, 12. 
55 Ibid, 46. 
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motivations can not be used to judge the mission as 
immoral.  The motivations of the decision makers are what 
dictates the morality of the mission, for targeting 
military leaders solely for the purpose of revenge is in 
fact unethical; however, as we will see, revenge was a 
secondary benefit to the pilots and commanders of a 
tactical mission. 
 It has been argued that Admiral Yamamoto was 
considered a war criminal by many prominent Americans 
responsible for waging the war against Japan,56 and 
therefore deserving of punishment.  But was he a war 
criminal, and if so what made him so?  Was it his lethal 
attack on Pearl Harbor, or some other heinous crime less 
known to the American people?  If he was a war criminal is 
punishment a legitimate motivator for his targeting?
 Pearl Harbor was attacked the morning of December 7, 
1941 with out a declaration of war from Japan.  The obvious 
response from my opponents would be that we all know that 
Japan had intended to deliver a formal declaration of war 
to the United States prior to the attack, but that 
confusion resulted in the attack occurring prior to the 
declaration of war.57
                                               
56 Ibid, 19. 
  My first response to such an argument 
57 Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, 259. 
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is that we must keep in mind that what we know today can 
not be used to judge the men of yesterday.  It seems 
apparent that when the declaration of war was delivered 
that the natural course of events would have lead to the 
discovery that Japan had intended to declare war prior to 
the attack and that it was a simple and understandable 
mistake.  This would seem to negate an argument of 
ignorance, but does it?  We must keep in mind that America 
had just lost thousands of lives due to an unexpected 
attack.  How could we expect our leaders to believe our 
newly sworn enemies that it was an accident? 
 Let us however, entertain the idea that the 
declaration of war had been delivered prior to the bombs 
exploding as planned, would this have changed the idea that 
the attack was illegal and immoral? 
The Japanese navy, headed by Admiral Yamamoto, 
knowingly set into action a sequence of events that would 
result in the death and destruction of United States 
personnel and property during a time of peace with full 
knowledge and intent of deceiving the United States by 
using to their advantage the current state of peace between 
the United States and Japan.  The Japanese government even 
went so far as to continue peace talks with the United 
States while they readied and positioned their war ships to 
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attack Pearl Harbor.  The intent here was obvious, to keep 
the United States unprepared to defend itself while the 
Japanese fleet readied itself to destroy the American 
Pacific Fleet.  I argue that the attack on Pearl Harbor 
took place the moment the Japanese fleet left port for 
Hawaii. 
Law and morality both make exceptions to nearly any 
rule however, and it may be that one exists here.  Though 
Japan did intentionally deceive America so as to enable 
them to crush our fleet we must understand that it was not 
without provocation.  Finding Japan’s aggressiveness 
unfavorable the United States began to apply pressure to 
dissuade Japan from its imperialistic advances.  When Japan 
failed to concede, and joined Germany and Italy in the 
Tripartite Pact the United States refused to sell Japan oil 
and steel which Japan desperately needed for its war 
machine,58 and of which Japan received eighty percent of its 
consumption from the United States.59
                                               
58 James C.  Ryan, “History may have given Japanese Admiral Isoroku 
Yamamoto more credit for military genius than he deserved.” 
Perspectives 66. 
  In effect, Japan had 
been backed into the proverbial corner and saw no way out 
but to fight a vastly superior force.  A force that had 
used its political and industrial might to ensure its own 
59 Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial 
Navy, 188-189. 
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superiority.60
It may be difficult to say with certainty whether the 
attack on Pearl Harbor was criminal or not, but it was with 
out a doubt questionable.  What should leave no confusion 
however was Japan decision to attack the barracks housing 
the pilots of American fighter planes.  The laws of war 
since the time of the Hague convention, which Japan signed 
in 1899,
  Japan’s only hope was a surprise attack that 
would annihilate the American Pacific Fleet and Yamamoto 
understood this. 
61
As the commander of the Japanese navy and the master 
mind of Pearl Harbor, Admiral Yamamoto was personally 
responsible for targeting the pilots’ barracks thereby 
making Admiral Yamamoto a war criminal.  Furthermore, as 
the case of General Tomoyuki Yamashita points out, 
commanders are ultimately responsible for the crimes of the 
men under their command.   
 have specifically prohibited the use of force 
against unarmed persons both civilian and military.  The 
men in the barracks being fighter pilots had no weapons 
available to them in which they could return fire of any 
sort and therefore ceased to be combatants and legitimate 
targets of war. 
                                               
60 Ibid, 27-29.  
61 Sheldon M. Cohen, Arms and Judgment, 10. 
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General Yamashita, being found guilty of war crimes 
when his men executed prisoners of war as United States 
forces recaptured the Philippines, appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court claiming that he had not ordered or 
committed any war crimes.  Yamashita argued that due to the 
chaotic conditions of combat he had lost contact with his 
troops and was only in effective command of the troops in 
his presence and was therefore not responsible for the 
actions of his troops.  The Supreme Court refused to hear 
his case stating: 
 “It is evident that the conduct of military 
operations by troops whose excesses are unrestrained 
by the orders or efforts of their commanders would 
almost certainly result in violations which it is the 
purpose of the law of war to prevent…Its purpose... 
would be largely defeated if the commander of an 
invading army could with impunity neglect to take 
reasonable measures for their protection.  Hence the 
law of war presupposes that its violation is to be 
avoided through the control of the operations of war 
by commanders who are to some extent responsible for 
their subordinates.”62
                                               
62 Ibid, 24. 
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The Tokyo tribunal stated that commanders were not only 
responsible for failing to act upon known crimes committed 
by their men, but for failing to know what their troops are 
doing, Yamashita was hanged for his crimes.  Therefore, 
following the case of Yamashita, Admiral Yamamoto was 
ultimately responsible for all of the atrocities committed 
by naval personnel from the date of his appointment as 
commander and chief to the day of his death. 
As Mr. Woodruff argues however, no act of war is 
justified by the mere fact that an individual is guilty of 
a crime.  Though Yamamoto was indeed a war criminal by the 
standards of the time, he was also entitled to a trial, a 
trial that Admiral Halsey looked forward to and was angered 
to be denied.63
                                               
63 Burke Davis, Get Yamamoto, 188. 
  It may seem odd to speak of morality and 
war, but the simple fact is that war exists and we have the 
power to make it more or less moral.  In order to make it 
more moral, we need to preserve those values and morals 
being fought for.  This means that we must try war 
criminals when possible, not chase them down and execute 
them, therefore, if the intent of the mission was to punish 
a war criminal than the “Yamamoto Mission” would have been 
immoral. 
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 Yamamoto was a brilliant and successful commander 
whose men idolized him,64 and was revered by his countrymen 
in a god like fashion.65  His brilliant planning had nearly 
wiped out the American Pacific fleet in Pearl Harbor, and 
may have very well destroyed what was left at Midway had it 
not been for the fortunate breaking of the Japanese code.  
Wake, the Dutch Indies and Burma were other Japanese 
victories accomplished by Yamamoto’s spectacular 
leadership.66  There can be no question that the removal of 
Yamamoto from command of the Japanese Navy served a 
definite purpose for the American war effort, and in fact 
this is what was considered before the order was given to 
strike.67
Given that the primary motivator was the removal of an 
effective command element whose existence was believed to 
be prolonging the war the “Yamamoto Mission” was in fact 
ethical, because its chief aim was to shorten the duration 
of the war thus saving lives.  Further, even those who 
morally object to war must concede that when faced with two 
evils it would immoral not to choose the lesser of the two 
evils.  Though intentionally killing an individual may be 
viewed as immoral by some, allowing that individual to live 
   
                                               
64 Ibid, 8. 
65 Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, 392. 
66 Burke Davis, Get Yamamoto, 8. 
67 Ibid, 8. 
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at the expense of thousands, perhaps millions of others is 
even more immoral. 
 Though Davenport agrees that the primary motivation 
for targeting Yamamoto was not punishment or revenge and 
that it was in fact motivated by tactical considerations he 
does not believe the mission was ethical.  Davenport argues 
that war should be fought in such a manner as to preserve 
the values being championed,68
Critical combat decisions however, were made by junior 
ranking officers previous to the “Yamamoto Mission”.  As 
far back as the American Civil War critical combat 
decisions have been made by junior officers.  Joshua 
Lawrence Chamberlain, commander of the 20th Main at the 
battle of Gettysburg, made the critical decision to mount 
 but he fails to make any 
strong connection of failed values to the “Yamamoto 
Mission”.   He argues that the targeting of high ranking 
military officials set a precedent that had the result of 
pushing leadership back from the battle lines leaving 
critical decisions to junior officers on the ground thereby 
increasing the difficulty of conducting effective warfare.  
In other words, setting a precedent that did us more long-
term harm than short-term good. 
                                               
68 Manuel M. Davenport, “The Killing of Yamamoto Viewed as Ethically 
Wrong”, edited by R. Cargill Hall, Lightning Over Bougainville, 
Washington D.C.:  Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991, 54. 
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bayonets and charge the enemy when his troops had expended 
their ammunition and were about to be overrun.  The end 
result, the enemy was so stunned by this maneuver that they 
either dropped their weapons and surrendered, or turned and 
ran thus saving the union forces from being flanked.  Where 
were the commanding General and his senior officers?  They 
were located in a position believed to be relatively safe 
from enemy fire. 
The “Yamamoto Mission” did not push commanders back 
from the front, technological advances such a frequency 
jumping radios and other real-time communication devices 
have pushed the commanders back.  The argument that the 
“Yamamoto Mission” negatively altered the command of troops 
in battle does not hold water. 
 A second argument brought forth by Mr. Davenport 
against the morality of targeting Yamamoto is the 
contributions Yamamoto could have brought to the peace 
table.  He points out the fact that Yamamoto had been 
against any war with America from the start,69 and had even 
gone so far as to put his life in danger through his peace 
keeping efforts.70
                                               
69 Ibid, 55. 
  It is unclear however, how much of 
Yamamoto’s efforts at peace were known by the United 
70  Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, 159. 
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States, if any, prior to the wars conclusion.  Without the 
knowledge of Yamamoto’s efforts he simply became a great 
enemy tactician that was hindering the American effort and 
needed to be removed.  If Yamamoto’s efforts had been known 
to American forces his removal from command can still be 
justified, for America’s current relationship with Japan 
proves the admiral’s presence was not needed to rebuild the 
nation and develop strong ties between the United States 
and Japan. 
 Davenport also raises the concern of reinforcing 
Japanese soldiers resolve in defeating America by killing 
such a revered leader.  Hiroyuki Agawa tells us the death 
of Yamamoto had quite the opposite affect stating that, 
“Both for navy men and the general public, Yamamoto’s death 
was a source not only of deep grief but of anxiety about 
the future course of the war.”71
                                               
71 Ibid, 388. 
  The killing of Yamamoto 
not only removed a threat but also destroyed the morale of 
the enemy both at home and in the trenches while serving as 
a motivational boost to American forces.  Yamamoto’s death 
also ended Japanese hopes of recapturing Guadalcanal, 
thereby preventing a Japanese offensive on Australia; at 
least two entire battles were prevented by his death. 
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 The Morality of war changes with time.  Once it was 
not only permissible to rape the women, loot and burn the 
villages, it was considered one of the spoils of victory 
and was the means of payment for the services of the 
troops.  Today that manner of warfare is not condoned and 
in fact can draw the fury of other nations.  In the past 
war was a matter of attrition.  Today however, enemies 
killed in action is less important, instead we target 
factories, ammo dumps, fuel supplies, and as the “Yamamoto 
Mission” shows, effective enemy leaders, Admiral Yamamoto 
was such a leader. 
 Yamamoto was a leader who effectively used the 
information gleaned from his time spent in the United 
States to wage a costly war.  Yamamoto was a leader whose 
repeated success drew the attention of his adversaries who, 
when afforded the opportunity, decided to remove this 
threat in a manner sanctioned by the laws of war.  The 
decision was made not as a form punishment for the war 
crimes Yamamoto was responsible for as the commander in 
chief of Japan’s navy, and not out of revenge for the 
spilling of American blood.  The decision to kill Yamamoto 
was made because he was seen as the enemy’s most able 
strategist, one Japan could not afford to loose and one 
America could not allow remaining in control. 
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Hindsight is twenty-twenty, and we have come to learn 
the Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was not the evil “Jap” 
portrayed in the American propaganda effort of World War 
II, but instead was a compassionate, intelligent man who 
loved America.  Yamamoto was highly respected by his 
countrymen, and could have aided our reconstruction efforts 
greatly.  We can not however, make the decision of who 
lives and who dies in war based from the possibilities of 
their future contributions.  The man in a machine gun nest 
is targeted not because he has less to contribute to the 
peace table than the cook in the mess tent, but because the 
machine gunner is a greater threat.  Likewise, Yamamoto was 
a greater threat as commander in chief of Japan’s combined 
fleet, than he was an asset to the peace table.  That is 
what determined his fate, and that is why the “Yamamoto 
Mission” is morally acceptable. 
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